This is the longer version of what happened on March 16, 1969. Thanks for taking your time to read this report! |
Subject: Re: MIA Vietnam Date: Thu, 30 Nov 2000 09:22:07 EST From: LewSchmidt@aol.com Hi, Thought you might enjoy this preliminary edit of the hundreds of pages of information I've gathered. The next most important step is to try and find a detailed topographical map of the Da Nang and Hue area and plot the flight's route from the radio transmissions and try to find the mountain where it probably crashed. Any ideas are welcome. OVERVIEW On 16 March 1969 an "olive drab" (military color) 1966 U21A aircraft, engine type PT6A-20, Serial Number 66-18007 (tail), USARVFLT, departed Long Thanh North Army Airfield at approximately 0705 hours, or, according to another source {E10}, 2305Z hours, on a priority passenger aircraft mission USARV number 21-2 with pilot Capt. [David] Richard R. Smith and co-pilot Charles R. Barnes. They were enroute to Hue/Phu Bai, with stops at Long Binh and Qui Nhon.{E10} "Both aviators were qualified in U-21A type aircraft and are instrument rated."{E44} The plane was part of "Command Airplane Co., 210th Avn Bn, 1st Avn Bde." The U21 had an airspeed of 190 knots per hour and a passenger capacity of ten persons, plus the pilot and co-pilot. They picked up five passengers at Sanford AAP at Long Binh, GS-16 Balser (code 6), LTC Mitchell, Maj. Marvin L. Foster, SP4 Michael L. Batt and Pfc Raymond E. Bobe, along with Batt's dufffel bag, listed on passenger list as A, B, C, D, E, and F. SSG Nolan C. Lockwood testified to seeing SP4 Batt "seated out front of the operations shack...[with] his personal belongings" at Sanford Airfield waiting for transportation. SP5 Scott M. Sutton testified "I drove the detachment vehicle to Stanford [sic] Airfield, Long Binh Post" with Maj. Foster and PFC Bobe as passengers, and observed them both board the airplane with personal baggage.{E47-48} Listed on the flight plan and schedule with times of arrival and departure were Long Thanh, Vung Tah 0705-0720, Long Binh 0740-0900, Qui Nhon 0915-1015, Hue Phu Bai 1015 (loss occured), Qui Nhon CXL 1300-1335, Nha Trang 1350-1420, Phan Thiet 1435-1505, Long Binh, DnLat Camlu 1615-1700, Long Binh 1710-1725, Vung Tah, Long Thanh. During the projected trip to Hue Phu Bai and return thirteen passengers were to be transported to various stops, including "DUFFLE BAG" and "VEGS." The scheduled start and stops were: Long Thanh, Vung Tau (0705), Long Binh (0720-0740), Qui Nhon (0900-0915), Hue Phu Bai (1015), Qui Nhon (CXL 1380), Nha Trang (1335-1350), Phan Thiet (1420-1435), Long Binh (1505), DnLat Camly (1615), Long Binh (1700-1710), Vung Tau (1725), Long Thanh. During this flight, "mission USARV 21-2", the plane would be identified in radio transmissions with traffic controllers as "Long Trip double 0 seven" (Long Trip 007), and the incident of loss would be known as "REFNO 1407". During this flight toward Hue/Phu Bai they would make too stops, one at Long Binh and the other at Qui Nhon. The aircraft proceeded to Sanford AAP at Long Binh where it picked up five persons, SP4 Michael L. Batt, GS 16 Balser (code 6), LTC Mitchell and two others not identified by this source (excluded data, but probably Maj. Foster and PFC. Bobe) at 0730 hours. The plane left Sanford at 0740 hours. It proceeded to Qui Nhon where Balser and Mitchell disembarked at approximately 0900 hours. It was reported that the aircraft departed Qui Nhon with Smith, Barnes, Foster, Batt and Bobe, and continued north towards Hue Phu Bai where it was scheduled to land at approximately 1015 hours. Because of weather conditions, they were required to revert from visual to instrument flight rules because of the low cloud ceilings, poor visibility and rain showers in the Da Nang/Hue area. Although in radio contact with controllers, contact was lost during the approach pattern to Phu Bai airfield and contact was not regained. The aircraft was lost at 1041 hours (10:41 AM), also reported as "1015 hrs" and position of last radio contact was "16-17N 107-40E at which Long Trip 007 was told to turn left to 090 degrees and climb to 3000 feet. This transmission was not acknowledged and subject aircraft was not identified on radar. Therefore it is not known if Long Trip 007 executed the turn. Later information stated the aircraft was handed off from the GCA to Hue Approach Control at 1036 hours, and "after 5 minutes of radio contact, no further transmissions were received". "Long Trip 007 allegedly failed to respond to radar corrections" and was ordered to return to Phu Bai Approach Control for assistance. Long Trip 007's last radio transmission was to Phu Bai Approach Control giving its position as SE of Phu Bai heading south at 2000 feet, in the vicinity of some high mountains where they could have crashed on a mountain side. The forward visibility at 2000 feet was zero in the Phu Bai area. Radio Transmission Transcript Da Nang Rapcon Departure Control 007 Hue Departure, Long Trip double O seven, double O seven Dept Long Trip double O seven, this is Da Nang Departure, go ahead 007 Ah roger, references showing the zero six zero, approximately two zero on the Sierra Foxtrot, reading point zero, would like a handoff to Hue Approach Control. Dept Double O seven, squawk one zero zero zero, ident; and understand you are at flight level eight zero. 007 Roger, at eight zero, ident. Dept Long Trip double O seven, say your radial and DME again, please. 007 Negative radial and DME, we're on the zero three zero now of the Sierra Foxtrot, approximately zero five miles. Dept Roger Long Trip double O seven, have radar contact seven miles northeast of airport, remain V?R conditions. 007 We're popeye at the present time 007 Departure, Long Trip double O seven, did you copy, we're popeye. Dept Long Trip double O seven, roger, maintain flight level eight zero. 007 Roger Dept Long Trip double O seven, you're cleared to the Hue Airport via point Alpha, report intercepting [word was difficult to read] the three four three radial from DaNang, over. 007 Report the three four three, roger. Dept Long Trip double O seven, report your Point Alpha estimate. Dept Long Trip double O seven, DeNang Departure, say your Point Alpha estimate. 007 Estimating Point Alpha at two three Dept Ah, roger, two three Dept Long Trip double O seven, squawk low please 007 Double O seven, low 007 Long Trip double O seven is three four three, eight thousand Dept Long Trip double O seven, roger Dept Long Trip double O seven, squawk zero one zero zero, ident, for Hue Dept Long Trip double O seven, ident again, please 007 Ident Dept Long Trip double O seven, contact Hue Approach Control on three seven four point one, over. 007 Three seven four point one End of transcript Radio Transmission Transcript Hue GCA GCA-Controller, GCA-Approach, APP-Coordinator, Coord-Tower GCA Go ahead approach APP Ten and a half mile east, heading two two zero, he's a Long Trip double O seven....level at two thousand. GCA You say double O seven? APP Right GCA OK James Bond GCA OK, two forty six eight, November Lima APP OK, you got 'em? GCA Right, radar contact APP Juliet, Juliet 007 Hue GCA, Long Trip double O seven GCA Long Trip zero zero seven, this is Marine Hue GCA. I hear you loud and clear, how me, over. 007 Loud and clear GCA Radar position, nine miles east of airport GCA Zero zero seven, say your present altitude 007 Two thousand Coord Wow! GCA (not keying) say again Coord Two thousand! He's that high? GCA How long, how high did you say he was, I didn't hear you. Coord Two thousand 007 Hue GCA Long Trip zero zero seven, I'm showing at one zero sero of the Echo Victor Beacon GCA Zero zero seven, roger, this will be a no gyro approach, turn left, make turns standard rate. GCA Zero zero seven, preclude minima; two hundred forty nine feet, one half mile, acknowledge. 007 Roger GCA Zero zero seven, if runway not in sight at precision minima, turn right heading three six zero.... Tower Go ahead Coord Long Trip zero zero seven, a U-twenty one, six miles Tower OK, check three Coord OK GCA Zero zero seven, stop turn GCA Zero zero seven, say your BME 007 Zero zero seven, negative BME GCA Zero zero seven, say your approximate position from the airport 007 Zero zero seven, I have no idea GCA Contact Approach Central, three seven four decimal one, GCA standing by. 007 Roger GCA Tell Approach Control that. Coord OK Tower Continue Coord Hey, uh, tower Tower Yeh Coord OK, we don't have him yet, we run him back to approach, we lost him, Tower OK, thank you Time pause of approximately two minutes Coord Hot line....Hot line GCA We're going to need another qualified controller Coord OK GCA Go ahead APP GCA GCA OK, go ahead APP OK, zero zero seven, I don't know where the hell he is now. OK, your next one is Spare 862 End of transcript Radio Transmission Transcript Hue Approach APP Ten and a half east, heading two two zero is Long Trip double O seven, level at two thousand. GCA Did you say double O seven? APP Right GCA OK, James Bond, OK, two forty six point eight, November Lima APP OK, you got em? GCA Right, radar contact APP Juliet Juliet Transcript continued after the aircraft returned to approach frequency (elapsed time 2 minutes 37 seconds) APP Go ahead GCA GCA Yes, we lost Long Trip zero sero seven, he's coming back to you APP They got him, Charlie Echo GCA OK APP Go ahead GCA GCA OK. This ah is Lieutenant Goodale, what's going on out there? What, what's the scoop with zero zero seven? What do you know? Do you have him on radar? APP Yes sir, we do. GCA OK, well, I was the one who just took that handoff and, ah, I understand he was about seven miles when I took the handoff, is that the one? APP He was about nine and a half, ten miles, when he was switched to you, yes sir. GCA Well, right now he's about four or five miles in there, OK? Well, I got the handoff, he was about two thousand, he was high, he did not take my turns. Now you have more than one aircraft east of the airport right now you're working. APP That we're working, yes sir. GCA You do? APP Uh huh. GCA I think this is a possible mess, I did, or anyway, bring him around again for another handoff and, ah, back to you, cause I wasn't sure of the, ah, target and I am sure you had him. APP Did you give him a missed approach? GCA Yes, I have him, ah, three sixty at thirty five hundred. APP All right sir, thank you. GCA OK End of this transcript Radio Transmission Transcript Hue Approach-Cont. 007 Hue Approach, Long Trip double O seven Cont Double O seven, roger, I have radar contact one four miles east of the airport. Verify level at eight thousand. 007 Eight thousand Cont Roger, turn right heading three six zero, descend and maintain two thousand for victors to precision final approach course to runway seven. Hue weather; estimated seven hundred broken, fifteen hundred overcast, seven miles, winds; two eight zero at one zero, altimeter estimated three zero zero nine. 007 Roger, copy Cont Nine five four, Hue This aircraft transmitted to controller three times and the controller transmitted four. Square six nine eight transmitted to approach five times. Nine five four and the controller transmitted one each again. Cont Roger double O seven, say your passing altitude 007 Through six five Cont Roger six position one four miles northeast 007 OK Cont Long Trip double O seven, if you hear no transmissions received one minute this victor, or five second on final, you are cleared for approach. 007 Double O seven 007 Approach, double O seven Cont Double O seven, Hue, go 007 Can we put on request a clearance for immediate takeoff after we land for VPR on top. Cap two zero eight called approach Cont Long Trip double O seven roger, ah, double O seven, on departure contact Hue departure on two seven three decimal one. 007 Roger Cont Talked to Cap two zero eight Cont Long Trip zero zero seven turn right heading zero nine zero. 007 Right to zero nine zero Cont Long Trip zero zero seven say passing altitude 007 Zero zero seven passing five thousand Cont Zero zero seven continue right turn to heading one four zero. 007 Right to one four zero Approach three transmissions to nine five four, nine five four two transmissions to approach. Cont Long Trip double O seven report passing three thousand five hundred. 007 Double O seven, roger Transmission unreadable Cont Calling Hue, say again Six six zero transmitted to approach and controller transmitted to six six zero Cont Long Trip double O seven, your position one seven miles northeast. 007 Double O seven through three five, say altimeter Cont Ah, roger, altimeter three zero zero niner 007 Roger Controller transmitted to nine five four twice, nine five four acknowledged twice. Five transmissions to eight six two. Eight six two to controller four times. 007 Zero zero seven level at two thousand Cont Roger Long Trip zero two seven, ah zero zero seven, turn right heading two two zero. 007 Right to two two zero Cont Long Trip zero seven, position ah fourteen and a half miles east. 007 Roger Controller two transmissions to eight six two. Eight six two one to controller. Cont Long Trip double O seven contact GCA, two four six decimal eight. 007 Two four six eight Eight six two dash two five miles Transcript continued after the aircraft returned to Approach frequency (elapsed time two minutes three seven seconds) 007 Hue Approach, Long Trip double O seven Cont Long Trip double O seven, Hue 007 Can you give us a position fix please Cont Ah roger, sir, I believe you are one zero miles east of the airport; squawk zero one zero zero, ident. 007 Ident. Cont Double O seven ah say heading 007 Present heading one eight five and we are squawking low at present time. Cont Roger squawk normal 007 Normal and ident. Controller and eight six three each transmitted two times Cont Double O seven negative contact at this time, say your position off sixty nine. 007 Alright, I am showing the one three zero off of victor ah, echo victor. Could you turn us out to sea again, I think we are heading pretty close to these mountains over here. Cont Roger, make a left turn to heading zero nine zero 007 Left to zero nine zero Cont Double O seven say your altitude 007 Two thousand Cont Roger, climb and maintain three 007 Climbing to three Nine five four and controller five transmissions each 007 Double O seven level three thousand Controller and eight six two each transmitted The controller attempted contact with 007 seven times after the aircraft reported level at 3000. All frequencies including guard were used End of transcript At some point, the controller seemed to be getting overloaded with involvement and possibly not providing the needed or correct guidance to U21. Documents alleged that 007 "failed to respond to radar corrections".{E55} "The aircraft was required to revert from visual to instrument flight rules because of the low cloud ceilings, poor visibility and rain showers in the Da Nang/Hue area.{E10} Weather conditions at 1000 hours were broken clouds at 700 feet, overcast at 1500 feet, visibility six miles in fog, temperature 71F degrees, dew point 69F degrees, winds 280 degrees at 10 knots, altimeter 30.09 inches. By 1100 hours, conditions had slightly improved to 800 feet broken clouds, five miles visibility in light rain and fog, dewpoint 66F, wind at 8 knots, and altimeter 30.11 inches. When the status of Capt. Smith was changed from missing to presumed dead on 15 Oct. 1973, it was stated that the mountains in the Phu Bai area are 5,000 feet, and with the plane at 3,000 feet "there is a good probabilty that the aircraft crashed into the mountains killing all personnel aboard." The location is "thick foilage and jungle canopy". Elevations confirmed by {E60-61} Da Nang air/sea rescue was notified, but initial efforts were limited to a ommunications search because of the bad weather. When the search was initiated, weather conditions were described as "Estimated 700 broken, 1500 overcast, 7 miles visibility in light rain showers. Scattered clouds with an early morning...Ground fog burning off to 6 miles visibility with haze, wind light and variable." Search missions were conducted by 101st Airborne Division (AM) and also aircraft from the 220th Aviation Company.{E56} The all day search by aircraft was conducted on 19 Mar. 1969 and was limited by weather conditions and jungle terrain. The area searched was bounded by 16-06N 107-35E to 16-07N 107-26E to 16-22N 107-30E to 16-20N 107-38E to start. DaNang SAR (Search and Rescue) was alerted and assigned at "161900M Mar 69", and their serach would be discontinued on 20 Mar. 1969, no sighting having been made, and XXIV Corps would take over the search on 21 Mar. 1969, "condensed to patterns with terrain elevations of 600 meters or more...Callsign and frequency was established as `Coachman Search Control' on 64.95 mc". The second search effort was terminated at sundown 24 Mar. 1969 (search coordinates provided). All sightings were prior known crash sites. Intelligence was unable to identify any enemy activity in the immediate area that may have involved 007. Based on a replotted flight path, the indicated last known location of the plane was in the vicinity of grid coordinates YC 936965{E10}, approximately 30 km southeast of Hue. One source reported that the remains and dog tags relative 007 were found at a crash site within 20 kilometers of the last known location of the plane. Another location was given as 15 kilometers west-southwest of Phu Loc and eight kilometers north-northeast of Nong Truong Hai Dong, Thua Thien-Hue Province {E5}; or one kilometer west of Tuoi Mountain, Quang Nam-Da Nang (formerly Thua Thien) Province, Vietnam. On 24 Jul. 1975 coordinates were changed from YD760241 to YC936965 based on a plotted map attached to reportof proceedings by investigating officer 14 Apr. 1969.{12} Also "southeast of Phu Bai, heading south at an altitude of 3,000 feet."{E62-63} Crash site 48QYC936065, Lat/Long 161358N1074449E.{E9} "The aircraft executed a missed approach", later changed to "During radar vector". The area where the aircraft was lost was also reported as "CAC Long Thanh North RVN". One document included "LYD 760 241 Thua Thien [coordinates & province] (02) I CTZ RVN. Unknown if status is the result of hostile action". "The hostile threat in the area precluded any visits to or ground inspections of the sites involved."{E10} Intelligence sources provided no additional information.{E55} "A former resident [possibly Nguyen Van Mai] of Vinh Hien Village, Phu Loc District (also reported as Binh Tri Thien Province), reported that while searching for incense wood on Loc Thuy Mountain (ZC 1694) he and his uncle found the wreckage of an aircraft that had hit the side of the mountain. He reported they recovered remains (assortment of small human bones) and two identification tags with the inscribed names of [Bobe] and David Smith...Ho Chi Minh City Public Security officials confiscated" the material in May 1986 and the source was given a receipt, and the remains and tags were repatriated 6 Apr. 1988. The remains could not be proven to be any of the men on 007. {E5-6 & E85-86} The resident stated they "came upon the wreckage of an aircraft that had hit the side of the mountain (source was unable to provide an exact location of the crash site). The aircraft was totally burned, and pieces of the aircraft were widely scattered from the point of impact down the side of the mountain. He could not identify the type of aircraft and saw no identifying numbers or symbols, but found the bones and dog tags of Smith and Bobe. He placed the bones in two small nylon bags about the size of a cantaloupe{E85}, which were later confiscated by authorities and turned over to the US. Another source reported discovering in late 1980 or early 1981 "a number of items, including two dog tags" near the forest edge of the Son Thanh National Collective Farms in Tuy Hoa, Phu Khanh. See sketch in file under maps. The items included a small camera, gold colored watch, black plastic portfolio (plastic zip-lock and no handle), and two dog tags on a long chain and short chain and connected together. The briefcase contained approximately 20 pages of type written material, yellowed with age, which were later destroyed when used to start fires at the camp. No skeletal remains or clothing fragments were found at the discovery site. After his arrival at Palawan VRC, he attempted to contact his friend "Duong" in regard to the items but was unsuccessful. The area was an unpopulated forest prior to 1975.{E73} This was an area possibly correlated to the 007 crash site.{E76} Later reports by a female source related heresay information on 5 or 6 US graves in the Nam Dong area (VIC YC 8786),{E10} possibly related to 007, and wreckage of a C0123 (possibly U21) 30 km southeast of Hue, and two dog tags and personal articles near the Nong Truong Nez (approx. YC 8785), possibly related to 007, and removed from a crashsite on a mountain near a fresh water lake, possibly related to an "intermittent lake located vicinity of ZC 132 984". Also reported was information related to (data) and David Smith in the vicinity of G.C. ZC1694. The source's father claimed to have the remains of three US servicemen. She also provided information from a dog tag rubbing and "social security number", name, service number, blood type and religion.{E10} Dog tags for Capt. Smith and PFC Bobe were aquired from remains dealers and turned over to the US at the repatriation in Hanoi on 06 Apr. 1988.{E12} Original source has the remains of four individuals "on whom he provided ID media data. A tooth was forwarded as proof."{E10} (originally reported in T88-144) After the war, near Jan. 1992, and again on 3 and 12 Jan. 1993, a team visited the site in Quang Nam-Danang and Thua Thien-Hue Provinces, at grid coordinates ZC199949, where the source reported the remains and dog tag were found, but technical experts claimed the wreckage found at the scene related to another case, case 1055, which was a resolved incident, although the dog tag matched 007 personnel. "It appears the witness has confused the remains the material evidence and the crash sites. In 1997, family members of at least Capt. Charles R. Barnes were contacted for blood samples of females of the family and Charles' sister Mary provided samples of her blood. After providing the samples and not hearing anything, she persued the matter with her Representative but never heard anything, and was told they needed samples for every man on the plane before they could do the tests. That's just a small part! Lew Subject: Re: MIA, Long Trip 007 Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2001 16:36:19 EST From: LewSchmidt@aol.com Hi, MIA, aboard Long Trip 007: Capt. David R. Smith, Capt. Charles R. Barnes, Maj. Marvin L. Foster, SP4 Michael L. Batt and PFC Raymond E. Bobe. My conclusions on the loss of Long Trip 007: I've finally assembled the maps and plotted the course of Long Trip 007 from the radio transmissions. After being circled by the air traffic controllers at Hue/Phu Bai airfield, in an area ENE of the airfield, apparently when they were handling too many aircraft and did a poor job of control, the pilot and co-pilot realized the mess they were in and asked to be turned out to sea. They were then traveling south and made the turn east and proceeded toward the Gulf of Tonkin, unfortunately directly in line with Loc Thuy Mountain, the only high elevation in that area along the coast. Thinking they were over water and safe to decrease altitude to get under the cloud cover and relocate their position, they crashed into the mountain which was 592 meters or 1942 feet high. This was corroborated by a couple of Vietnamese who found some bones and the dogtags of two of the men aboard the plane on Loc Thuy Mountain while searching for incense wood. The area contains the wreckage of several crashes. Sad! A turn to sea slightly north or south of the position, and they would have cleared to the Gulf. Most unfortunate!! Lew |
